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Abstract. The Principal Ideal Problem (resp. Short Principal Ideal
Problem), shorten as PIP (resp. SPIP), consists in finding a generator
(resp. short generator) of a principal ideal in the ring of integers of a
number field. Several lattice-based cryptosystems rely on the presumed
hardness of these two problems. In practice, most of them do not use an
arbitrary number field but a power-of-two cyclotomic field. The Smart and
Vercauteren fully homomorphic encryption scheme and the multilinear
map of Garg, Gentry, and Halevi epitomize this common restriction.
Recently, Cramer, Ducas, Peikert, and Regev showed that solving the
SPIP in such cyclotomic rings boiled down to solving the PIP. In this
paper, we present a heuristic algorithm that solves the PIP in prime-power
cyclotomic fields in subexponential time L|∆K| (1/2), where ∆K denotes
the discriminant of the number field. This is achieved by descending to
its totally real subfield. The implementation of our algorithm allows to
recover in practice the secret key of the Smart and Vercauteren scheme,
for the smallest proposed parameters (in dimension 256).
1 Introduction
Hard problem in lattices. Lattice-based problems appear to be among the
most attractive alternatives to the integer factorization and discrete logarithm
problems due to their conjectured resistance to quantum computations. For-
tunately, all cryptographic primitives can be instantiated on the hardness of
? c©IACR 2017. This article is the final version submitted by the authors to the IACR
and to Springer-Verlag on February 2017.
solving lattice problems, such as signature, basic encryption, Identity Based
Encryption (IBE) as well as Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) [21]. Not all
these schemes rely on the same lattice-based problem. For instance, the NTRU
cryptosystem [24], which is one of the most efficient encryption scheme related to
lattices, is based on the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). Besides, the authors of
NTRU were the first to consider specific kinds of lattices, namely those related to
polynomial rings. This idea was followed by the definition of another lattice-based
problem that is the topic of a large body of works [31,32,33,34,44]: the Ring
Learning With Error Problem (RLWE). Cryptosystems based on RLWE present
both an efficient key size reduction and improved performance (for instance
decryption, encryption and signature are faster than with arbitrary lattices). Yet,
RLWE belongs to the specific family of ideal-lattice problems, which stem from
algebraic number theory. This raises a potential drawback, since those lattices
carry more structure than classical lattices, as they are derived from ideals in
integer rings of number fields.
SPIP and PIP. Another presumably hard problem related to these ideals is
called the Short Principal Ideal Problem (SPIP). It consists in finding a short5
generator of an ideal, assuming it is principal. For instance, recovering the secret
key from the public key in the Smart and Vercauteren FHE scheme [43] and in
the Garg, Gentry, and Halevi multilinear map scheme [20], consists in solving an
instance of the SPIP. This problem turns out to hinge on two distinct phases:
on the one hand finding an arbitrary generator — known as the Principal Ideal
Problem (PIP) — and on the other hand reducing such a generator to a short
one. The problem of finding a generator of a principal ideal, which is the aim of
this article, and even testing the principality of an ideal, are difficult problems in
algorithmic number theory, as precised in [15, Chapter 4] and [45, Section 7].
From SPIP to PIP in Cyclotomic Fields. Recently, Cramer, Ducas, Peikert,
and Regev [17] showed how to recover a small generator of a principal ideal in
a prime-power cyclotomic field from an arbitrary generator in polynomial time.
This work was based on an observation of Campbell, Groves, and Shepherd [12]
who first proposed an efficient algorithm for reduction, essentially by decoding
the log-unit lattice. The correctness of this approach was corroborated by Schank
in an independent replication study [39].
Studying SPIP and PIP in this very specific class of number fields is motivated
by the concrete instantiations of the various schemes. Again the Smart and
Vercauteren FHE scheme [43] and the Garg, Gentry, and Halevi Multilinear Map
scheme [20] exemplify this restriction to cyclotomic fields.
Prior work on the PIP. Solving the PIP essentially requires the computation
of the ideal class group Cl(K) of the number field K where the ideals are defined.
5 Short means that we have a norm. In our case, it is derived from the canonical
embedding of the number field into a Euclidean space.
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This approach is described in [15, Algorithm 6.5.10] (see [5, Algorithm 7] for a
description in line with the approach of this paper). The first subexponential
algorithm for computing Cl(K) was due to Hafner and McCurley [23]. It applies
to imaginary quadratic fields, and it was later generalized by Buchmann [11] to
classes of number fields of fixed degree. In [8], Biasse and Fieker presented an
algorithm for computing Cl(K) in subexponential time in arbitrary classes of
number fields. Combined with [5, Algorithm 7], this yielded a subexponential
time algorithm for solving the PIP in arbitrary classes of number fields. In a
prime-power cyclotomic field of degree N , the Biasse-Fieker algorithm solves the
PIP in time L|∆K| (2/3 + ε)
(
≈ 2N2/3+o(1)
)
, for ε > 0 arbitrarily small. Biasse
also described in [6] an L|∆K| (1/2 + ε)-algorithm that compute Cl(K) and solve
the PIP in fields of the form Q(ζpk)6. Note that the PIP is also the subject of
research on quantum algorithms for its resolution. Recently, Biasse and Song [9]
described a quantum polynomial time algorithm for the PIP in classes of number
fields of arbitrary degree.
Our results. The main contribution of this paper is an algorithm for com-
puting the class group Cl(K+) and solving the PIP in K+ in time L|∆K| (1/2)(
≈ 2N1/2+o(1)
)
where K+ is the maximal real subfield of prime-power cyclotomic
field K and N denotes its degree. Thanks to the Gentry-Szydlo algorithm, our
algorithm also provides a solution to the PIP in K with the same L|∆K| (1/2)-
complexity.
In addition to this theoretical study, we implement an attack against a FHE
scheme that relies on the hardness of finding a small generator of ideals in those
fields. We were able to recover in practice a generator in the field Q(ζ512). Such
parameters were proposed by Smart and Vercauteren as toy parameters in [43].
The most challenging part of the computation was to efficiently implement the
Gentry-Szydlo algorithm [22]. We used the version of Gentry-Szydlo described
by Kirchner in [26]. We also implemented an algorithm for descending to the
subfield K+ from K and for collecting relations between generators of Cl(K+).
Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we recall mathematical results for
lattices and algebraic number theory that we use in the rest of the paper. Then,
Section 3 presents the principal ideal problem (PIP) and the cryptosystems based
on this problem such as the Smart-Vercauteren fully homomorphic encryption
scheme. Next, we describe the different steps of the algorithm to solve PIP in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 gives information about our experimentations.
2 Mathematical background
We recall briefly here basic facts on lattices and algebraic number theory. A more
detailed introduction is provided in the Appendix A.
6 There was a small mistake in the original description which was corrected in a
subsequent version.
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General notations. For dealing with complexities, we introduce the L-notation,
that is classical when presenting index calculus algorithms with subexponential
complexity. Given two constants a and c with a ∈ [0, 1] and c ≥ 0, we denote by:
L|∆K|(a, c) = e
(c+o(1))(log |∆K|)a(log log |∆K|)1−a ,
where o(1) tends to 0 as |∆K|, the discriminant of the number field, tends to
infinity. We also encounter the notation L|∆K| (a) when specifying c is superfluous,
that is considering quantities in L|∆K|(a,O(1)).
2.1 Lattices
Lattices are defined as additive discrete subgroups of Rn, i.e. the integer span
L(b1, . . . ,bd) =
⊕d
i=1 Zbi of a linearly independent family of vectors b1, . . . ,bd
in Rn. Such a family is called a basis of the lattice, and is not unique. Nevertheless,
all the bases of a given lattice have the same number of elements, d, which is
called the dimension of the lattice. Among the infinite number of different bases
of an n-dimensional lattice with n ≥ 2, some have interesting properties, such as
having reasonably small vectors and low orthogonality defect — that means that
they are almost orthogonal.
The problem of finding such good bases is the aim of lattice reduction. There
are in short two kinds of reduction algorithms: approximation algorithms on
the one hand, like the celebrated LLL algorithm and its blockwise variants
such as BKZ and DBKZ [35], and exact algorithms on the other hand, such
as enumeration or sieving, that are exponential in time and space. In high
dimension, only approximation algorithms — which run in polynomial time in
the dimension7 — can be used to find relatively short vectors, but usually not
the shortest ones.
The DBKZ algorithm and Cheon’s determinant trick. In this part, we
recall the complexity of DBKZ algorithm, introduced by Micciancio and Walter
in [35], its approximation factor, and a trick due to Cheon and Lee [14] that
improves this factor for integer lattices with small determinant.
Theorem 1 (Bounds for DBKZ output). The smallest vector output by
DBKZ algorithm with block-size β has a norm bounded by:
β
n−1
2(β−1) ·Vol (L)
1
n .
The algorithm runs in time Poly(n, size(B)) · (3/2 + o(1))β/2, where B is the
input basis and (3/2 + o(1))β/2 stands for the cost of solving the Shortest Vector
Problem in dimension β, using sieving techniques (see [3]).
Proof. This is a direct application of [35, Theorem 1], where the Hermite con-
stant γβ is upper bounded by β.
7 BKZ and DBKZ are exponential in the block size.
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In a note [14] of 2015, Cheon and Lee suggest to convert the basis of an
integer lattice having small determinant, to its Hermite normal form (HNF)
before reducing it, for instance with the DBKZ algorithm. This algorithm seems
to be folklore. In particular, Biasse uses a similar strategy in the context of
class group computations in [5, Section 3.3]. This note gives a detailled analysis
and we refer to this method as Cheon’s trick. We develop here this idea and
derive corresponding bounds. For completeness purpose, the definition of HNF is
recalled in Appendix A.1. More precisely we have
Lemma 1. Given B = [b1, . . . ,bn] a basis in HNF of a n-dimensional lattice L,
we have for any 1 ≤ i < n:
Vol ([b1, . . . ,bi]) ≤ Vol ([b1, . . . ,bi+1]) .
In particular, for any sublattice L′ generated by the m first vectors of B, we have
Vol (L′) ≤ Vol (L).
Remark that both the n-th root of the determinant and an exponential factor
of n appear in the bound of Theorem 1. Hence we can perform the DBKZ
reduction on a sublattice only generated by the first m columns of the HNF in
order to minimize this upper bound, as a trade-off between these quantities.
Explicitly we fixm =
⌊√
2β
log β log(Vol (L))
⌉
and run the algorithm of Figure 1
on the basis B = (b1, . . . ,bn):
1. Compute the HNF (b′1, . . . ,b′n) of B.
2. Run DBKZ with block-size β on (b′1, . . . ,b′m) with m =
⌊√
2β
log β log(Vol (L))
⌉
.
3. Return the first vector of the output of DBKZ.
Fig. 1: Approx-SVP algorithm with HNF+DBKZ with block-size β.
Theorem 2. For any n-dimensional integer lattice L such that Vol (L) ≤ β
n2
2β ,
the output v of the previous Approx-SVP algorithm satisfies:
‖v‖ ≤ β(1+o(1))
√
2 logβ(Vol(L))/β .
This algorithm takes time Poly(n, size(B))(3/2 + o(1))β/2.
Proof. The condition on the covolume of L ensures that m ≤ n.
Then, by Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 we have
‖v‖ ≤ β
m
2β ·Vol (L′)
1
m
≤ β
m
2β ·Vol (L)
1
m
≤ β
√
2 logβ(Vol(L))/β ,
which yields the announced result.
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2.2 Number Fields
Let K = Q(α) be a number field of degree N , then there exists a monic irre-
ducible degree-N polynomial P ∈ Z[X] such that K ' Q[X]/(P ). Denoting by
(α1, . . . , αN ) ∈ CN its distinct complex roots, each embedding (field homomor-
phism) σi : K→ C is the evaluation of a ∈ K, viewed as a polynomial modulo P ,
at the root αi, i.e. σi : a 7→ a(αi). Let r1 be the number of real roots and r2 be the
number of pairs of complex roots (N = r1 +2r2), we have K⊗R ' Rr1 ×Cr2 . We
define the norm ‖ · ‖ over K as the canonical Euclidean norm of σ(x) ∈ Rr1 ×Cr2
where σ(x) = (σ1(x), . . . , σr1+r2(x)) ∈ Rr1 × Cr2 , where σ1, . . . , σr1 are the real
embeddings of K and σr1+1, . . . , σN are the complex embeddings of K, each σr1+j
being paired with its complex conjugate σr1+r2+j . The number field K is viewed as
a Euclidean Q-vector space endowed with the inner product 〈a,b〉 =
∑
σ σ(a)σ̄(b)
where σ ranges over all the r1 +2r2 embeddings K→ C. This defines the euclidean
norm denoted ‖ ·‖. The algebraic norm on K is defined as NK/Q(v) =
∏N
i=1 σi(v).
Coefficient embedding and ideal lattices. Let α be one of the roots αi (it
may differ from the initial α if this one is not an algebraic integer). Considering the
natural isomorphism between Z[α] ⊂ OK and Z[X]/(P ) gives rise to an embedding
of Z[α] trough the coefficients of associated polynomials. More precisely, we have
the following sequence of abelian groups
ZN ι↪−−−−→ Z[X] π−−−−→− − Z[X]/(P ) ' Z[α]
(c0, · · · , cN−1) 7−→
∑
0≤i<N
ciX
i 7−→
∑
0≤i<N
ciα
i,
defining the announced embedding by coefficients as C = ι−1 ◦ π−1. Such an
embedding provides a norm in the field, namely: ‖a‖C = ‖C(a)‖2.
Let us state a basic result on the link between field norm and polynomial
representation:
Lemma 2. For algebraic integers defined as polynomials in α, namely a = T (α)
for T ∈ Z[X], we can bound the norm by
|NK/Q(a)| ≤ (N + 1)m/2(m+ 1)N/2H(T )NH(P )m,
where m = deg T , N = degP and H(P ) is the absolute maximum of the coeffi-
cients of P .
Proof. Remark first that the norm of this element corresponds to the resultant
of the polynomials T and P [15, Proposition 4.3.4]. Then we apply the bounds
of [10, Theorem 7] for the resultant of two polynomials and conclude.
As a result, we can directly relate the norm of the embedding with the field
norm:
Corollary 1. For any a ∈ Z[α]: |NK/Q(a)|
1
N ≤ (N + 1) ·H(P ) · ‖a‖C .
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Canonical embedding and ideals. A remarkable property of the canonical
embedding is the way it represents the ring of integers and more generally every
integral ideal. Indeed, the embedding σ(a) of any integral ideal a is a Euclidean
lattice. In particular, for the ring of integers, we have that σ(OK) is a lattice.
Its (co)volume is called the discriminant ∆K of the field K. Therefore, one can
compute the discriminant as a determinant: for (b1, . . . ,bN ) an integral basis
of OK, we have
∆K =
det

σ1(b1) σ1(b2) · · · σ1(bN )
σ2(b1)
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
σN (b1) · · · · · · σN (bN )


2
.
Loosely speaking, the discriminant is a size measure of the integer ring. That
is why we use it to express the complexity when we work with number fields or
rings of integers. Moreover, it acts as a proportionality coefficient between the
norm of an ideal and the covolume of its embedding:
Lemma 3. For any integral ideal a of K, we have σ(a) is a lattice of RN and
Vol (σ(a)) =
√
|∆K|N (a),
where Vol (L) is the covolume of the lattice L.
Smoothness of ideals. To evaluate the probability of smoothness of ideals,
we need to assume the same unproven heuristic as in [5,8], directly derived
from what has been proved for integers by Canfield, Erdős and Pomerance [13].
Let P(x, y) be the probability that a principal ideal of OK of norm bounded by x
is a power-product of prime ideals of norm bounded by y. Then, we have
Heuristic 1 ([5, Heuristic 1]) We assume that under the Generalized Rie-
mann Hypothesis (GRH), the probability P(x, y) satisfies
P(x, y) ≥ e−u logu(1+o(1)) for u = log xlog y .
Heuristic 1 was put in perspective with Scourfield’s work [40] by Biasse and
Fieker [8, Section 3.1]. In the number field setting, the previous heuristic admits
a neat rewriting in terms of the handy L-notation:
Corollary 2 ([5, Corollary 2.1]). Let x = blogL|∆K| (a, c)c and the smooth-
ness bound y = dlogL|∆K| (b, c′)e. Then assuming Heuristic 1, the probabil-
ity P(x, y) that an ideal of OK of norm bounded by x is a power-product of
prime ideals of norm bounded by y satisfies
P(x, y) ≥ L|∆K|
(
a− b, −c
c′
(a− b)
)
.
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A similar assertion for smoothness of ideals was proved by Seysen [41] in 1985
for the quadratic case, but for arbitrary degree, it remains conjectural, even
under GRH. This is one of the reasons why the complexity of the number field
sieve (NFS) [29] is still a heuristic estimation.
2.3 Cyclotomic fields and Cyclotomic Integers
We denote by Φm the m-th cyclotomic polynomial, that is the unique irreducible
polynomial in Q[X] dividing Xm − 1 that is not a divisor of any of the Xk − 1
for k < m. Its roots are thus the m-th primitive roots of the unity. Therefore,
cyclotomic polynomials can be written in closed form as:
Φm =
∏
1≤k≤m
gcd(k,m)=1
(
X − e2iπ km
)
.
The m-th cyclotomic field Q(ζm) is obtained by adjoining a primitive m-th
root ζm of unity to the rational numbers. As such, Q(ζm) is isomorphic to the
splitting field Q[X]/(Φm). Its degree over Q is deg(Φm), that is ϕ(m), where ϕ
is the Euler totient function. In this specific class of number fields, the ring of
integer is precisely Z[X]/(Φm) ∼= Z[ζm] (see [46, Theorem 2.6] for a proof of this
statement).
The canonical embedding can also be easily presented since the embeddings
are the linear functions sending ζm to ζjm, for j ∈ (Z/mZ)∗. Since the roots come
in conjugate pairs (ζjm = −ζm−jm for all j), we can write down the Log-embedding
by indexing over the quotient G = (Z/mZ)∗
/
{−1, 1}:
Log(x) : K −→ Rϕ(m)/2
P mod Φm 7→
(
log |P (ζjm)|
)
j∈G.
The discriminant of Q(ζm) has a closed form expression [46, Proposition 2.7]:
∆Q(ζm) = (−1)
ϕ(m)/2 m
ϕ(m)∏
p|m
pϕ(m)/(p−1)
,
where the product in the denominator is over primes p dividing m.
Example 1. For a prime-power cyclotomic field, we get
∣∣∣∆Q(ζ
pk
)
∣∣∣ = p(kp−k−1)pk−1 .
In particular, when p = 2,
∣∣∆Q(ζ2n+1 )∣∣ = 2n2n .
For power-of-two cyclotomic fields, we then have L|∆K| (α) = 2O(N
α log(N)).
Thus, writing the complexity as L|∆K| (α) or 2O(N
α log(N)) is equivalent. We
choose to use the L-notation, since it eases the exposition of the complexities
presented in this paper.
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2.4 Cyclotomic units
Giving the complete description of the units of a generic number field is a
computationally hard problem of algorithmic number theory. However it is
possible to describe a subgroup of finite index of the unit group, called the
cyclotomic units. This subgroup contains all the units that are products of
numbers8 of the form ζim − 1 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m. More precisely we have
Lemma 4 (Lemma 8.1 of [46]). Let m be a prime power, then the group C
of cyclotomic units is generated by ±ζm and (bi)1≤i≤m, where
bi =
ζim − 1
ζm − 1
.
The index of the subgroup of cyclotomic units in the group of units is h+(m),
the class number of the totally real subfield of Q(ζm) (see for instance [46]). In
the case of power-of-two m, a well supported conjecture clarifies the value of h+.
Heuristic 2 (Weber’s class number problem) We assume that for power-
of-two cyclotomic fields, the class number of its totally real subfield is 1.
Thus, under Weber’s heuristic, the cyclotomic units and the units coincide in
the power-of-two cyclotomic fields.
3 Principal-Ideal Problem and Cryptography
Among all the FHE schemes proposed in the last decade, the security of a couple
of them directly relies on the ability to find relatively short generators in principal
ideals. This is the case of the proposal of Smart and Vercauteren [43], which is a
simplified version of the original scheme of Gentry [21]. Other schemes based on
the same security assumptions include the Soliloquy scheme of Campbell, Groves
and Shepherd [12] and the candidates for multilinear maps [20,28]. More formally,
the underlying — presumably hard — problem is the following one, already known
as SPIP (Short Principal Ideal Problem) or SG-PIP (Short Generator-Principal
Ideal Problem): given some Z-basis of a principal ideal with a promise that it
possesses a “short” generator g for the Euclidean norm, find this generator or at
least a short enough generator of this ideal.
The strategy to address this problem roughly splits in two main steps:
1. Given the Z-basis of the ideal, find a generator, not necessarily short, that
is g′ = g · u for a unit u.
2. From g′, find a short generator of the ideal.
8 One should notice that if m is a prime power, ζim − 1 is not a unit, but bi is.
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Recently, several results have allowed to deal with the second step. Indeed,
Campbell, Groves and Shepherd [12] claimed in 2014 an — although unproven —
efficient solution for power-of-two cyclotomic fields, confirmed by experiments
conducted by Schank [39] in 2015. Eventually, the proof was provided by Cramer,
Ducas, Peikert, and Regev [17] in 2015. Throughout this paper, we focus on the
resolution of the first step, known as PIP (Principal Ideal Problem). Nonetheless,
for completeness, we present briefly the reduction from SPIP to PIP in section 4.4.
As a direct illustration of the resolution of this problem, we present an attack
on the scheme that Smart and Vercauteren present in [43], which leads to a full
key recovery. This attack is our key thread through the exposition of the algorithm.
Before going any further in the details of the attack, we recall in Figure 2 the key
generation process in the case of power-of-two cyclotomic fields. This instantiation
is the one chosen by the authors for presenting their implementation results.
1. Fix the security parameter N = 2n.
2. Let F (X) = XN + 1 be the polynomial defining the cyclotomic field K = Q(ζ2N ).
3. Set G(X) = 1 + 2 · S(X) for S(X) of degree N − 1 with coefficients absolutely
bounded by 2
√
N , such that the norm N (〈G(ζ2N )〉) is prime.
4. Set g = G(ζ2N ) ∈ OK.
5. Return (sk = g, pk = HNF(〈g〉).
Fig. 2: Key Generation of the scheme [43].
Remark 1. The public key can be any Z-basis of the ideal generated by g, or even
a two-elements representation of this ideal. Precisely, [43] provides the public key
as a pair of elements that generates the lattice. This is always possible, see [15,
Section 4.7.2]. We make the choice of the Hermite Normal Form representation9.
As our attack consists in a full secret key recovery, realized directly from the
public key, we do not mention here the encryption and decryption procedures.
Even though this work tackles more on the principal ideal problem than on this
reduction, we emphasize the fact that the output of this reduction to a short
generator can be any one of the g · ζi2N , having same Euclidean norm for any
1 ≤ i ≤ 2N . Nonetheless, this does not represent an issue, since all of these
keys are equivalent with regard to the decryption procedure. In addition, in this
precise construction of the Smart and Vercauteren FHE scheme, the only odd
coefficient of G(X) is the last one, so that we may recover the exact generator g
readily.
The whole complexity of our attack is subexponential, in L|∆K| (1/2). This
beats the previous state-of-the-art in L|∆K| (2/3), derived from the combined
work of [8] and [17].
9 The definition of the HNF is recalled for completeness in Appendix A.
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4 Solving the PIP or how to perform a full key recovery?
We recall that our ultimate goal is to perform a full key recovery given only
the public elements. As mentioned in [43], this problem is obviously much more
difficult than recovering a plain-text from a cipher-text which is based on the
bounded distance decoding problem and the security level is set according to
this latter problem. We first give an overview of the whole strategy and then
get an in-depth view of each part. But before going any further into the details
of the attack, let us fix the notations and recurrent objects we are going to use.
The number field where the PIP is defined is Q(ζ2N ), for N = 2n, defined by
the polynomial XN + 1, in the same fashion as in Section 2.3. For the sake of
notation simplicity, ζ2N is simply denoted by ζ. Though we focus on power-of-two
cyclotomic fields, all our results can be easily generalized to arbitrary prime-power
cyclotomic fields. Our starting point is the public key, that is, a somewhat “bad”
basis of the principal ideal I = 〈g〉, generated by the secret key g.
Before any other operations, the dimension of the ideals involved is shrunk
by half by reducing the problem to an equivalent one in the totally real subfield
Q(ζ + ζ−1). This is not mandatory (see [6]), but it eases the computation. This
part of the algorithm is a straightforward consequence of the Gentry-Szydlo
algorithm introduced in [22]. The problem is now reduced to the research of a
generator of an ideal I+ in the totally real subfield. Then, the strategy appears to
be recursive reductions of ideals, until we eventually reach a B-smooth ideal Is,
for a fixed bound B > 0 and an algebraic integer h such that 〈h〉 = I+ · Is. This
is the q-descent phase.
We are now interested in finding a generator of Is. We use a strategy based
on class group computation. It consists in finding a generating set of all the
relations between generators of the class group, and then rewrite the input ideal
with respect to these generators. Then we can recover a generator h0 of Is by
solving a linear system of equations. It then permits to derive the generator
of the ideal I+: h · h0−1. A generator of the public-key ideal is then obtained
by lifting it from the totally real subfield to the initial number field Q(ζ). It
suffices to multiply the current generator by another integer obtained during the
computation. Now the PIP is solved, it only remains a final step to recover the
secret key: perform the reduction from this generator to a short one, using the
method of [17].
Consequently, the full algorithm can be split in four main steps, which are, in
a nutshell:
1. Perform a reduction from the cyclotomic field to its totally real subfield,
allowing to work in smaller dimension.
2. Then a q-descent makes the size of involved ideals decrease.
3. Collect relations and run linear algebra to construct small ideals and a
generator.
4. Eventually run the derivation of the small generator from a bigger one.
Let us now get into the details of all these parts.
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4.1 Step 1: Reduction to the totally real subfield
Starting with the public key, we get a Z-basis (b1, . . . ,bN ) of an ideal I belonging
to the cyclotomic field Q(ζ) of dimension10 N . The larger the dimension is, the
harder it is to handle and even only represent such objects. However, it is possible
to halve the dimension. The main part of this step relies on the so-called Gentry-
Szydlo (GS) algorithm, first described in [22] as an attack on the NTRU scheme
and later revised and generalized by Lenstra and Silverberg in [30].
This original algorithm takes as input a Z-basis of an ideal I in the ring
Z[X]/(XN + 1) — with the promise to be principal — and the algebraic in-
teger u · ū, for u a generator of I. Here, ū denotes the conjugate of u for the
automorphism defined by ζ 7→ ζ−1. It then recovers in polynomial time the
element u. In our case, we can not perform the recovery of the generator g, secret
key of the scheme, since a priori we do not have access to any kind of information
about the product g · ḡ.
To overcome this difficulty, we introduce another integer u = N (g) g ḡ−1, as
described by Garg, Gentry, and Halevi in [20, Section 7.8.1]. One should notice
that the norm factor is only there to avoid introduction of denominators in the
definition of u. Although u is still unknown at this point, thanks to the Z-basis
of 〈g〉 we can construct a Z-basis of 〈u〉 and deriving the product u · ū which
simply corresponds to N (g)2.
Hence, we get access to u in polynomial time using GS. From this element u,
we directly reconstruct g ḡ−1 and using the basis of I, we then introduce the
family of vectors
ci = bi
(
1 + ḡg
)
,
providing a basis of the ideal I+ generated by g + ḡ. The reader should notice
that this ideal belongs to the totally real subfield Q(ζ + ζ−1), of index 2 in Q(ζ).
From now on, we denote by O+K the ring of integers of Q(ζ + ζ−1), corresponding
to OK ∩Q(ζ + ζ−1).
Let us suppose briefly that we know the generator g + ḡ of I+. Then it would
be sufficient to multiply it by 11+g ḡ−1 to recover the secret key g. Hence, we
have reduced the problem of finding a generator of the idea I belonging to the
cyclotomic field of dimension N to the one of finding a generator of ideal I+ that
belongs to the totally real subfield, whose dimension is N2 . For a more detailed
presentation of this technique, see [20, Theorem 8].
Note that even though the generator is known up to a unit — i.e. (g + ḡ) · v
for v ∈ UQ(ζ) — the generator of I recovered is g · v. This suffices, thanks to the
last reduction part, to recover a short generator.
One could wonder if working in a real field has some relevant matter with the
upcoming parts of the attack. The answer is up to our knowledge negative and
we are only interested in the halving of dimension. For the asymptotic complexity,
10 The smallest security parameters of the Smart and Vercauteren scheme is N = 256.
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this initial reduction is somehow not meaningful since it only gives a speedup
of a constant factor in the exponent. But in practice, it allows to double the
dimension of the tractable cases, implying tackling security parameters twice
bigger!
4.2 Step 2: q-descent phase
Let us momentarily set aside the algebraic integer obtained in the previous phase
and only focus on the ideal I+. By construction, it is principal and generated
by g + ḡ. From now on, all the computations are performed in the totally real
subfield of dimension N2 , and from then on N becomes
N
2 .
The goal of this phase is to find an integer h and a B-smooth principal
ideal Is, such that 〈h〉 = I+ · Is, for a certain bound B > 0. These objects
are discovered recursively, by generating at each step ideals of norm smaller
and smaller. This descent strategy derives from discrete logarithm computations
(see [1,25]) and has been adapted to number fields of large degree by Biasse [5,
Section 3.2]. Since we want a global complexity in L|∆K| (1/2), the smoothness
bound B is chosen11 in L|∆K| (1/2). In order to bootstrap this q-descent, we first
need to find an ideal that splits in the class group as a product of multiple prime
ideals of controlled norm, that is in our case, upper bounded by L|∆K| (1).
Initial round: classical DBKZ reduction. As announced, we aim to con-
struct efficiently a L|∆K| (1)-smooth principal ideal from I+. Formally, we want
to prove the following:
Theorem 3. Let K be a number field. Assuming Heuristic 1, from any ideal
a ⊂ OK, it is possible to generate in expected time L|∆K| (1/2) an integral ideal b
that is L|∆K| (1)-smooth and an integer v such that:
〈v〉 = a · b.
The difficulty of this preliminary part is that a priori the norm of the
input ideal a can be large. We thus want to construct at first an ideal whose
norm is bounded independently from N (a) in the same ideal class as a. We
proceed by ideal-lattice reduction, as Biasse did in [5, Section 2.2]. Through the
canonical embedding, any integral ideal a can be viewed as a Euclidean lattice.
As usual when dealing with lattice reduction, we are interested in small vectors,
or equivalently here, integers with small Euclidean norm. Let us first study the
guarantees that a classical DBKZ-reduction offers on the embedding of a.
11 Justification of this choice appears explicitly when we study the complexity of
the q-descent in the algorithm.
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Lemma 5. Let K be a number field of degree N , β ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and a be
an ideal of OK. Then it is possible to find a short element v ∈ a in time
Poly
(
N, logN (a)
)
(3/2 + o(1))β/2, that satisfies:
‖v‖ ≤ β
N
2β · |∆K|
1
2N · N (a)
1
N
where ‖.‖ denotes the Euclidean norm.
Proof. This is only a direct application of Theorem 1 and Lemma 3. Indeed, let v
be the short vector output by DBKZ applied to the lattice of the embedding of a.
It has determinant N (a)
√
|∆K|, yielding the announced upper bound.
Since the ideal a contains 〈v〉, there exists a unique integral ideal b satisfying
〈v〉 = a · b. From the guarantees on ‖v‖, we can bound the norm of this new
ideal b.
Corollary 3. With the same notations as in Lemma 5, we have
N (b) ≤ β
N2
2β ·
√
|∆K|.
Proof. From Lemma 5, we have
‖v‖ ≤ β
N
2β · |∆K|
1
2N · N (a)
1
N .
Thus, its field norm is below the N -th power of this bound — the NN term is
negligible here — and so:
N (〈v〉) ≤ β
N2
2β ·
√
|∆K| · N (a) .
As a consequence, since 〈v〉 = a · b, we have by the multiplicative property of the
norm N (b) ≤ β
N2
2β ·
√
|∆K|.
Remark 1. Because K is a cyclotomic field, we may choose a block-size β
in logL|∆K| (1/2) since logL|∆K| (1/2) = N1/2+o(1) ≤ N . Then Corollary 3 gen-
erates in time L|∆K| (1/2) an integral ideal of norm bounded by L|∆K| (3/2) .
This last result allows us to find an ideal of norm bounded independently
from N (a). We then want this new ideal to split in the class group as a product of
multiple prime ideals of controlled norms. Thanks to Corollary 2, the probability
of an integral ideal b of norm bounded by L|∆K| (3/2) to be L|∆K| (1)-smooth is
greater than L|∆K| (1/2)
−1. In addition, using ECM for testing smoothness keeps
the complexity in L|∆K| (1/2). The analysis of this part is left for Section 4.5.
Therefore, repeating the last construction L|∆K| (1/2) times on randomized inde-
pendent inputs eventually yields a L|∆K| (1)-smooth ideal. The simplest strategy
to perform this randomization of the input ideal is to compose it with some factors
of norm less than B = L|∆K| (1/2). Formally, we denote by B = {p1, . . . , p|B|} the
set of all prime ideals of norm upper bounded by L|∆K| (1/2). Let k,A > 0 be
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fixed integers. We choose pj1 , . . . , pjk prime ideals of norm L|∆K| (1/2). Then for
any k-uple (e1, . . . , ek) ∈ {1, . . . , A}k, we have
N
(
a ·
k∏
i=1
peiji
)
≤ N (a)·
k∏
i=1
N (pji)
ei ≤ N (a)·L|∆K| (1/2)
k·A = N (a)·L|∆K| (1/2) .
We know from the Landau prime ideal theorem [27] that in every number
field K, the number of prime ideals of norm bounded by X, denoted by πK(X),
satisfies
πK(X) ∼
X
logX . (1)
Thus, the randomization can be done by choosing uniformly at random the
tuple (e1, . . . , ek) and k prime ideals in B. Since |B| = L|∆K| (1/2), set of possible
samples is large enough for our purposes.
Other ways to perform the randomization may be by randomizing directly the
lattice reduction algorithm or by enumerating points of the lattice of norm close
to the norm guarantee and change the basis vectors by freshly enumerated ones.
The latter would be useful in practice as it reduces the number of reductions.
This last remark concludes the proof of Theorem 3. The full outline of this
bootstrap section is given in Figure 3.
1. CurrentIdeal ← a.
2. While CurrentIdeal is not L|∆K| (1)-smooth do:
3. Choose pj1 , · · · , pjk uniformly at random in B.
4. c← a ·
∏
peiji for random ei ∈ {1, . . . , A}.
5. Generate b from c as in Lemma 3.
6. CurrentIdeal ← b.
7. End while
8. Return CurrentIdeal.
Fig. 3: First reduction to a L|∆K| (1)-smooth ideal.
Interlude: reduction with Cheon’s trick. In the proof of Theorem 3, we use
the classical-DBKZ reduction in order to find a short element in the embedding
of the considered ideal. We could not use directly Cheon’s trick here since the
norm of the ideal I+ — and so the determinant of its coefficient embedding —
is potentially large. Nonetheless, the norm of prime ideals appearing in the
factorization are by construction bounded, hence a natural question is to look
at the guarantees offered when applying the sub-cited trick. The systematic
treatment of this question is the aim of Theorem 4.
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Theorem 4. Let a be an integral ideal of norm below L|∆K| (α), for 12 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Then, in expected time L|∆K| (1/2), it is possible to construct an algebraic integer v
and an L|∆K| ((2α+ 1)/4)-smooth ideal b such that:
〈v〉 = a · b.
Proof. The core of the proof is somehow similar to the proof of Theorem 3 as it
heavily relies on lattice reduction and randomization techniques. Nonetheless,
the major difference is on the embedding with respect to which the reduction is
performed. In Theorem 3, the canonical embedding is used, whereas we use here
the coefficient embedding C. It avoids the apparition of a power of the discriminant
in the field norm of the output of DBKZ. Nonetheless, remark that since we work
in the totally real subfield, we cannot use a naive coefficients embedding of this
subfield. In order to benefit from the nice shape of the defining polynomial XN +1
of the cyclotomic field, we use instead a fold-in-two strategy: the embedding
of O+K is defined as the coefficient embedding C+ for the Z-base (ζi + ζ−i)i. Let
us denote by ‖.‖C+ the induced norm. Hence, for any v ∈ O+K :
‖v‖C =
√
2‖v‖C+ .
Let L = C+(a) be the embedding of a. Its covolume is by definition its index
in Zn, that is the index of a as a Z-module in O+K , which is N (a). Then, with
the same block-size β = logL|∆K| (1/2) = O(
√
N log(N)), we have
Vol (L) ≤ L|∆K| (α) = 2
O(Nα log(N)) ≤ β
N2
2β .
Using the Approx-SVP algorithm of Theorem 2 yields in time L|∆K| (1/2) an
integer v satisfying:
‖v‖C+ ≤ β
(1+o(1))
√
2
logβ(det(L))
β ≤ β(1+o(1))
√
4 Nα√
N logN = L|∆K| (α/2− 1/4) .
Using Corollary 1 to fall back on the field norm induces:
NK/Q(v) ≤ (
√
2(N + 1))
N
· ‖v‖NC = L|∆K| (1) · L|∆K| (α/2 + 3/4) .
Since α ≥ 1/2, we then have N (〈v〉) = NK/Q(v) ≤ L|∆K| (α/2 + 3/4).
Because the ideal a contains 〈v〉, there exists a unique ideal b, satisfying
〈v〉 = a · b. We get that N (b) ≤ L|∆K| (α/2 + 3/4) from the multiplicative prop-
erty of the norm and N (a) = L|∆K| (1) ≤ L|∆K| (α/2 + 3/4). Under Heuristic 1,
this ideal is L|∆K| (α/2 + 1/4)-smooth with probability L|∆K| (1/2). Eventually
performing the randomization-and-repeat technique as in the initial round, this
reduction in the coefficient embedding yields the desired couple (v, b) in expected
time L|∆K| (1/2).
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Descending to B-smoothness. After the first round, we end up with an
L|∆K| (1)-smooth ideal, denoted by I(0), and an algebraic integer h(0) satisfying
〈h(0)〉 = I+ · I(0),
with I+ the ideal of the totally real subfield obtained after phase 4.1. The
factorization of I(0) gives
I(0) =
∏
j
I(0)j ,
where the I(0)j are integral prime ideals of norm upper bounded by L|∆K| (1).
Taking the norms of the ideals involved in this equality ensures that the number
of terms in this product is O(nI), with nI = log |∆K|log log |∆K| = O(N). Then apply-
ing Theorem 4 on each small ideal I(0)j gives rise to ideals I
(1)
j in expected
time L|∆K| (1/2) that are L|∆K|
( 2×1+1
4
)
= L|∆K| (3/4)-smooth and integers h
(1)
j
such that for every j,
〈h(1)j 〉 = I
(0)
j · I
(1)
j .
For each factor I(1)j , let us write its prime decomposition:
I(1)j =
∏
k
I(1)j,k .
Once again, the number of terms appearing is O(nI). Because we have the
inequality N
(
I(1)j,k
)
≤ L|∆K| (3/4), then performing the same procedure on each
ideal I(1)j,k now yields L|∆K| (5/8)-smooth ideals I
(2)
j,k and integers h
(2)
j,k such that
〈h(2)j,k〉 = I
(1)
j,k · I
(2)
j,k ,
once again in expected time L|∆K| (1/2). Remark that this smoothness bound
in L|∆K| (5/8) is obtained as L|∆K|
(
2×3/4+1
4
)
, as exposed in Theorem 4. This
reasoning naturally leads to a recursive strategy for reduction. At step k, we want
to reduce an ideal I(k−1)a1,...,ak−1 which is L|∆K|
(
1/2 + 1/2k+1
)
-smooth. As before,
we have a decomposition — in O(nI) terms — in smaller ideals:
I(k−1)a1,...,ak−1 =
∏
j
I(k−1)a1,...,ak−1,j .
Using Theorem 4 on each factor I(k−1)a1,...,ak−1,j which have norm bounded by
L|∆K|
(
1/2 + 1/2k+1
)
leads to L|∆K|
(
1/2 + 1/2k+2
)
-smooth ideals I(k)a1,...,ak−1,j
and algebraic integers h(k)a1,...,ak−1,j such that
〈h(k)a1,...,ak−1,j〉 = I
(k−1)
a1,...,ak−1,j
· I(k)a1,...,ak−1,j ,
since 2×(1/2+1/2
k+1)+1
4 = 1/2 + 1/2
k+2.
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As a consequence, one can generate L|∆K| (1/2 + 1/ logN)-smooth ideals with
the previous method in at most dlog2(logN)e recursive steps. At this point
only (nI)dlog2(logN)e ideals and algebraic integers appear since at each step this
number is multiplied by a factor O(nI). As deriving one couple integer/ideal is
done in expected time L|∆K| (1/2), the whole complexity remains in L|∆K| (1/2).
However, as |∆K| = NN , a quick calculation entails that
logL|∆K|
(
1
2 +
1
log(N)
)
= O(N
1
2 +
1
logN log(N))
= O(N 12 log(N)) ·N
1
logN .
Since the last factor is e = exp(1), we obtain that
logL|∆K|
(
1
2 +
1
log(N)
)
= logL|∆K|
(
1
2
)
,
so that after at most dlog2(logN)e steps, we have ideals that are L|∆K| (1/2)-
smooth.
At the end of this final round, we may express the input ideal as the product
of ideals for which we know a generator and others that have by construction
norms bounded by L|∆K| (1/2). Let us denote K the final step. For avoiding to
carry inverse ideals, we may assume without loss of generality12 that K is even.
Explicitly we have
〈h(0)〉 = I+ · I(0)
= I+ ·
∏
a1
I(0)a1
= I+ ·
〈∏
a1
h(1)a1
∏
a1,a2,a3
h(3)a1,a2,a3∏
a1,a2
h(2)a1,a2
〉
·
∏
a1,a2,a3
I(3)a1,a2,a3
= I+ ·
〈 ∏
a1,...,aK+1
∏
t∈2Z+1
h(t)a1,...,at∏
s∈2Z
h(s)a1,...,as
〉
·
∏
a1,...,aK+1
I(K)a1,...,aK+1 .︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Is
In this last expression, the indices are chosen such that 1 ≤ t ≤ K and
2 ≤ s ≤ K. We also recall that all the quantities involved here belong to the
totally real subfield Q(ζ + ζ−1).
By construction, Is is L|∆K| (1/2)-smooth and we directly get h ∈ O
+
K such
that 〈h〉 = I+ · Is. The full outline of this descent phase is sketched in Figure 4.
12 We can always run an additional step in the q-descent without changing the whole
complexity.
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Remark that the number of terms, which is at most O(N)K is in L|∆K| (o(1)),
is negligible in the final complexity estimate.
No smoothness guaranteesI+
I+ ·
∏
i
peijiL+
h0 I(0) I
(0) =
∏
j
I(0)j︸︷︷︸ L|∆K| (1)-smooth
N
(
I(0)a1
)
≤ L|∆K| (1)I(0)a1
I(0)a1
∏
i
peijiL(0)
h1 I(1)a1 I
(1)
a1 =
∏
j
I(1)a1,j︸︷︷︸ L|∆K| ( 34)-smooth
I(1)a1,a2
I(K−1)a1,...,aK−1 I
(K−1)
a1,...,aK−1 =
∏
j
I(K−1)a1,...,aK−1,j︸ ︷︷ ︸ L|∆K| ( 12 + 1logN )-smooth
I(K−1)a1,...,aK
I(K−1)a1,...,aK
∏
i
peijiL(K−1)
hK I(K)a1,...,aK L|∆K|
(
1
2
)
-smooth
L|∆K|
(
1
2
)
times
L|∆K|
(
1
2
)
times
d− log2(log(N))e steps
L|∆K|
(
1
2
)
times
Randomization
σ
σ−1
DBKZ
Randomization
DBKZ+Cheon’s trick
C
C−1
C
C−1
DBKZ+Cheon’s trick
Randomization
Fig. 4: The q-descent algorithm.
4.3 Step 3: Case of L|∆K| (1/2)-smooth ideals
At this point, we have reduced the search for a generator of a principal ideal
of large norm to the search for a generator of a principal ideal Is which is
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L|∆K| (1/2)-smooth. If we can find a generator of Is in time L|∆K| (1/2), from the
previous steps we directly recover the generator of I+, and so the generator of I,
that is the secret key. To tackle this final problem, we follow the approach relying
on class group computation (see [15, Algorithm 6.5.10] or [5, Algorithm 7]): we
consider the previously introduced set B of prime ideals of norm below B > 0
where B ∈ L|∆K| (1/2) and look for relations of the shape
(v) =
∏
i
peii , for v ∈ OK+ .
As the classes of prime ideals in B generate the class group Cl(OK+) (see [2]),
we have a surjective morphism:
Z|B| φ−→ SI
π−→ Cl(OK+)
(e1, · · · , e|B|) 7−→
∏
i p
ei
i 7−→
∏
i[pi]ei .
Formally, a relation is an element of Ker (φ◦π), which is a full-rank sublattice
of Z|B|. Following the subexponential approach of [8,11,23], we need to find at
least |B| ∈ L|∆K| (1/2) linearly independent relations to generate this lattice. The
relation collection is performed in a similar way as [4]: due to the good shape of
the defining polynomial XN + 1, the algebraic integers whose representation as
polynomials in ζ have small coefficients also have small norms.
Let us fix an integer 0 < A ≤ L|∆K| (0) = log |∆K|. Then for any integers
(v0, · · · , vN
2 −1
) ∈ {−A, . . . , A}N2 , we define the element v = v0+
∑
i≥1 vi
(
ζi + ζ−i
)
.
The norm of this element in K+ is upper bounded by L|∆K| (1). Indeed, it corre-
sponds to the square root of its norm in K, which is below NN ·AN = L|∆K| (1)
by Lemma 2. Then under Heuristic 1, the element v generates an ideal 〈v〉 that is
L|∆K| (1/2)-smooth with probability L|∆K| (1/2)
−1. This means that we need to
draw on average L|∆K| (1/2) independent algebraic integers to find one relation.
To bound the run time of the algorithm, we need to assume that the relation
we collect by this method are independent. This is a commonly used heuristic in
the analysis of index calculus algorithms for computing Cl(K).
Heuristic 3 ([4, Heuristic 2]) There exists Q negligible with respect to |B|
such that collecting Q · |B| relations suffices to generate the whole lattice of
relations.
Thanks to Equation (1), we know that B contains about L|∆K| (1/2) elements.
Therefore, L|∆K| (1/2) relations are needed thanks to Heuristic 3, implying that
L|∆K| (1/2)
2 = L|∆K| (1/2) independently drawn algebraic integers suffice to
generate the whole lattice of relations. Of course, the set of integers arising
from the previous construction is large enough to allow such repeated sampling,
because its size is L|∆K| (1). We store the relations in a |B| ×Q|B| matrix M , as
well as the corresponding algebraic integers in a vector G.
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M

e1,1 · · · e1,i · · · e1,Q|B|
e2,1 · · · e2,i · · · e2,Q|B|
...
...
...
e|B|,1 · · · e|B|,i · · · e|B|,Q|B|

G
(
v1 · · · vi · · · v|B|
)

∀i, (vi) =
|B|∏
j=0
p
ej,i
i .
The L|∆K| (1/2)-smooth ideal Is splits over the set B, so that there exists a
vector Y of Z|B| containing the exponents of the factorization
Is =
∏
i
pYii .
As the relations stored in M generate the lattice of all elements of this form,
the vector Y necessarily belongs to it. Hence solving the equation MX = Y
yields a vector X ∈ ZQ|B| from which we can recover a generator of the ideal
since: ∏
i
pYii = 〈v
X1
1 · · ·v
XQ|B|
Q|B| 〉. (2)
By construction, N (Is) ≤ L|∆K| (K/2 + 1/2) so that the coefficients of Y are
below L|∆K| (0). Since solving such a linear system with Dixon’s p-adic method [18]
can be done in time Poly(d, log ‖M‖) where d is the dimension of the matrix
and ‖M‖ = max |Mi,j | the maximum of its coefficients, we are able to recover X
with a complexity in L|∆K| (1/2).
4.4 Final Step: Reduction to a short generator
As mentioned in Section 3, this part of the algorithm is a result of Cramer, Ducas,
Peikert, and Regev [17]. They state that recovering a short generator from an
arbitrary one can be solved in polynomial time in any prime-power cyclotomic
ring. For completeness purposes, we give here a brief overview of this reduction.
As a liminary observation, note that for those fields, a set of fundamental
units is given for free, whereas their computation in arbitrary number fields is
computationally hard. A second remark is that we get the promise that there
exists a small generator of the considered ideal. Then, instead of solving a general
closest vector problem (CVP), we solve an instance of bounded-distance decoding
problem (BDD). The key argument is based on a precise study of the geometry
of the log-unit lattice of prime-power cyclotomic fields (see Appendix A.3 for
basic recalls about this lattice). Finally, their geometric properties make possible
to solve BDD in this lattice in polynomial time, instead of exponential time as
for generic instances.
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Theorem 5 ([17, Theorem 4.1]). Let D be a distribution over Q(ζ) with
the property that for any tuple of vectors v1, · · · ,vN/2−1 ∈ RN/2−1 of Euclidean
norm 1 that are orthogonal to the all-1 vector 1, the probability that the inequation
|(Log(g),vi)| < c
√
2N ·log(2N)−3/2 holds for all i is at least some α > 0, where g
is chosen from D and c is a universal constant. Then there is an efficient algorithm
that, given g′ = g · u, where g chosen from D and u ∈ C is a cyclotomic unit,
outputs an element of the form ζj · g with probability at least α.
The reader might argue that, in order to use this theorem on the output of our
algorithm, we should ensure that we recover a generator up to a cyclotomic unit
and not up to an arbitrary unit. In the specific case of power-of-two cyclotomic
fields, we can rely on Weber’s heuristic 2 to ensure this constraint. In case
h+(N) > 1, two solutions are given in [17]. The first one is to directly compute
the group of units, which is hopefully determined by the kernel of the matrix M
arising in the third stage13. One can then enumerate the h+(N) classes of the
group of units modulo the subgroup of cyclotomic units. Another possibility is to
generate a list of ideals, sampled according to the same distribution as the input
ideal, with a known generator. Then, we run the PIP algorithm on these ideals,
and deduce the cosets of the group of units modulo the subgroup of cyclotomic
units, which are likely to be output.
The whole key recovery, combining our PIP algorithm and the aforementioned
reduction is outlined in Figure 5.
1. Compute a generator g0 of I with Gentry-Szydlo, q-descent and relation collection.
2. Let B be the basis defined by the Log(bi) for bi = ζ
i
m−1
ζm−1 .
3. Set t = Log(g0) + Log(OK).
4. Return Babai’s rounding of Bb(B∧)t · te.
where b·e denotes the rounding function: bce = bc+ 12c.
Fig. 5: Recovery of the secret key by PIP+[17].
4.5 Complexity analysis
The whole runtime of our attack is L|∆K| (1/2), that is about 2N
1/2+o(1) operations.
We have already mentioned the complexity of most parts of our algorithm.
However, we provide a brief summary in this paragraph to ensure the entirety of
our result.
For the reduction algorithms, DBKZ and Cheon’s trick, the block-size is
always in logL|∆K| (1/2) so that the complexity is L|∆K| (1/2). Our choice for the
smoothness bound B = L|∆K| (1/2) ensures that the step of relation collection
together with the linear system solution are derived in time L|∆K| (1/2).
13 Another possibility is to use the saturation method which might run in polynomial
time [7].
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In addition, from the work of [20], we get that the first part of the algorithm,
corresponding to the reduction to the totally real subfield, is performed in
polynomial time.
The last part, which corresponds to the generation of a small generator from
an arbitrary one, runs in polynomial time with respect to the input (B, t) of
Babai’s round-off algorithm (see Step 4 of the algorithm in Figure 5), thanks to
the results of [17]. However, t = Log(g0) + Log(OK) is of subexponential size at
this stage. Indeed, according to Equation (2),
Log(g0) = X1Log(v1) + · · ·+XQ|B|Log(vQ|B|),
where each vi is of polynomial size while, by Hadamard’s bound, the Xi satisfy
Xi ≤ Q|B|Q|B|/2‖M‖Q|B|−1 maxj ‖Yj‖. Therefore, the bit size of the Xi are
in L|∆K| (1/2), and the fixed point approximations of Log(vi) must be taken at
precision b ∈ L|∆K| (1/2) to ensure the accuracy of the value of Log(g0) (and
therefore t). Babai’s round-off computation Bb(B∧)t · te has an asymptotic cost
in L|∆K| (1/2) and returns e1, · · · , er where the ei have bit size in L|∆K| (1/2) and
where
g′ = g0 · be11 · · ·berr =
(
vX11 · · ·v
XQ|B|
Q|B|
)
· (be11 · · ·berr ) ,
is a short generator of the input ideal. This product cannot be evaluated directly
since the intermediate terms may have exponential size, but it may be performed
modulo distinct prime ideals p1, · · · , pk such that N (
∏
pi) > N (g′) and then
reconstructed by the Chinese Remainder Theorem. The complexity of this process
is in L|∆K| (1/2).
We highlight now two points whose complexity were eluded in the exposition
of the algorithm:
– Arithmetic of ideals. All the operations made on ideals are classical, with
complexities polynomial in the dimension and in the size of the entries (see
for instance [15, Chapter 4]), which is way below the bound of L|∆K| (1/2).
– Smoothness tests. The strategy is to deal with the norms of ideals, that are
integers. The largest norm arising in the computations is in L|∆K| (3/2) and
appears after the initial DBKZ reduction. Testing L|∆K| (1)-smoothness for
an integer of this size is easier than completely factorizing it, even if both
methods share the same asymptotic complexity in L|∆K| (1/2)14. Hence all
the smoothness tests performed have complexity dominated by L|∆K| (1/2).
As a consequence the global complexity is given by the first and last steps of
the q-descent, that is in L|∆K| (1/2).
Remark 2. This algorithm has a complexity in L|∆K| (1/2) in the discriminant,
that represents the size of the number field involved. However, it is important to
figure out that the parameters of the keys have N3/2 bits. Therefore we present
an algorithm that is “sort of” L (1/3) in the size of the inputs.
14 Factorizing an integer N is done in LN (1/3).
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5 Implementation results
In addition to the theoretical improvement, our algorithm permits in practice to
break concrete cryptosystems. Our discussion is based on the scheme presented
by Smart and Vercauteren at PKC 2010. In [43, Section 7], security estimations
are given for parameters N = 2n for 8 ≤ n ≤ 11 since they are unable to generate
keys for larger parameters. Our implementation allows us to recover the secret
key from the public key for N = 28 = 256 in less than a day. The code runs
with PARI-GP [38], with an external call to fplll [19], and all the computations
are performed on an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1275 v3 @ 3.50GHz with 32Go
of memory. Indeed the Gentry-Szydlo algorithm requires large storage.
We perform the key generation as recalled in Figure 2. We then obtain a
generator for the ideal as a polynomial in ζ = ζ512, of degree 255 and coefficients
absolutely bounded by 2
√
256 +1 = 65537. That corresponds to ideals whose norm
has about 4800 bits in average, that is below the bound 6145 from Lemma 2, but
above the size given in [43] (4096). As for every timing arising in this section,
we have derived a set of 10 keys, and the given time is the average one. Thus,
deriving a secret key takes on average 30 seconds. We test 1381 algebraic integers
for finding 10 having prime norm. Then the public key is derived from the secret
key in about 96 seconds.
While, in theory, the first reduction to the totally real subfield seems to be
of limited interest, it is clearly the main part of the practical results: indeed, it
reduces in our example the size of the matrices involved from 256×256 to 128×128.
As we know that lattice-reduction is getting worse while the dimension grows,
this part is the key point of the algorithm. Our code essentially corresponds to
the Gentry-Szydlo algorithm together with the trick explained in Section 4.1, in
order to output the element u and a basis of the ideal I+ generated by g+ ḡ. This
part of the algorithm has the largest runtime, about 20 hours, and requires 24Go
of memory.
At this point, we put aside u and only consider the ideal I+. Our goal is
to recover one generator of this ideal, and a multiplication with 11+u is going
to lead to the generator of the input ideal. The method we have presented is
to reduce step by step the norm of the ideals involved by performing lattice
reductions. However, we observe that for the cases we run, the first reduction
suffices: the short vector we find corresponds to the generator. We make use
of the BKZ algorithm implemented in fplll [19], with block-size 24 to begin.
It gives a correct generator with probability higher than 0.75 and runs in less
than 10 minutes. If the output is not correct, we increase the block-size to 30.
This always works and requires between 2 and 4 hours.
In addition to the good behavior of this reduction, the generator we exhibit
is already small, by construction. More precisely, it corresponds to g + ḡ, up
to a factor that is a power of ζ. Hence, we recover g · ζi thanks to u and the
decoding algorithm analyzed in [17] is unnecessary for our concern. The key
recovery is already completed after these two first steps. We still implement this
part together with a method for recovering the actual private key (up to sign).
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Indeed, because all its coefficients are even except the constant one, it is easy to
identify the power of ζ that appears as a factor during the computation.
Additional work. To illustrate the practical performances of our method, we
look at one of the main other steps of the algorithm: namely the relation collection
between generators of Cl(K+). Thanks to the good behavior of BKZ, the relation
collection is not necessary for the attack in Q(ζ512), but it is an important part
of the computation in higher dimension.
We fix our factor base as all the prime ideals in the totally-real field that lie
above a prime number p that is below the bound c (log |∆K|)2, for a parameter
c ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}. We give in Table 1 the values, together with the size of the
factor base and the time required for building it in MAGMA [16]. The computations
are performed on a laptop with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4710MQ CPU @ 2.50GHz
and 8Go of RAM for this part.
Naturally, this choice of bound would not be sufficient for the descent de-
scribed in Figure 4, because it is polynomial and not subexponential. However, it
provides a relation matrix for the computation of the class group. Reaching a
subexponential bound seems unlikely in that way, that supports the fact that
our implementation results are consequences of the small dimension obtained by
the Gentry-Szydlo algorithm.
c Bound #primes #Factor Base Time (sec)
0.1 201516 149 18945 1240
0.2 403033 274 35073 2320
0.3 604549 385 49281 3320
Table 1: Construction of differently parametrized factor bases.
The relation collection is performed using algebraic integers of the shape
5∑
i=1
ζai + ζ−ai =
5∑
i=1
ζai − ζ256−ai ,
for ai chosen at random in {1, . . . , 255}. This is inspired from the work of
Miller [37]. We use C++ code with NTL Library [42] for finding a set of integers
with different norms that suffice for generating the full lattice of relations (see
Section 4.3). The size of these sets depends on the bound we have chosen and
on the relations picked, so that the timings may vary. Our results are provided
in Table 2. Once we know these integers, we use Magma for building the entire
matrix of relations. In particular, we make use of the automorphisms on the field
for deriving 128 relations from each integer — this is the reason we use integers
of different norms. Eventually, the matrices we get are full-rank.
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c #relations Time (hours)
relation collection matrix construction
0.1 1500 8.6 1.7
0.2 3400 13.8 4.9
0.3 6300 23.9 10.7
Table 2: Relation collection for the different parameters.
We also run our code for the algorithm described in [17] on inputs constructed
as a secret key multiplied by a random non-zero vector of the log-unit lattice
(because in the full attack described previously, we only have the null vector).
This runs in 150 seconds.
To conclude, for the parameter N = 28, the time of the key recovery is
below 24 hours, and the main part of the computation comes from the reduction
to the totally real subfield. Hence, one may wonder if this step is mandatory, and
the answer is yes, because the surprisingly good practical behavior of the BKZ
reduction is a conjoint consequence of the dimension of lattices involved on the
one hand — the regime for such medium dimension allows better practical output
bounds than the theoretical worst case — and the specificity of the geometry of
the considered ideals induced by the abnormally small norm of its generator.
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A Mathematical background recalls
A.1 Hermite normal form.
Definition 1. A m× n matrix B with integer entries has a (unique) Hermite
Normal Form (HNF) H such that there exists a square unimodular matrix U
satisfying H = BU and
1. H is lower triangular, hi,j = 0 for i < j, and any columns of zeros are located
on the right.
2. The leading coefficient (the first nonzero entry from the top, also called the
pivot) of a nonzero column is always strictly below the leading coefficient of
the column before it and is positive.
3. The elements to the right of pivots are zero and elements to the left are
non-negative and strictly smaller than the pivot.
The computation of the HNF can be done efficiently in O(nθM(n logM)) time
andO(n2 logM) space, where nθ is the arithmetic complexity of the multiplication
of two n× n matrices and M(b) = O(b) the complexity of the multiplication of
two b-bit integers (see [36] for more details).
A.2 Ring of integers, integer ideals
Integers of a number field. An element γ of K is said to be integral if its
minimal polynomial has integer coefficients and is monic. The ring of integers
of K is the ring of all integral elements contained in K, and is denoted by OK.
Noticeably, the norm of any integer of the number field is an integer.
For α a primitive element of K, we have Z[α] ⊂ OK, but Z[α] can be strictly
included in OK. Yet, as a finite-rank sub-module of the field K, there exists a
finite family (bi)i∈i such that OK ∼=
⊕
i∈I Z ·bi. Such a family is called an integral
basis of the number field.
Ideals and norms. An additive subgroup a of OK such that for every x ∈ a,
the coset x · OK = {x · a|a ∈ OK} lies in a, is called an integral ideal of the
number field. One can generalize the notion of norm of an element in the number
field to integral ideals: let define the norm15 N as the integer valued map:
a 7→ [OK : a] =
∣∣OK/a∣∣ .
15 We define here the absolute norm of an ideal.
29
The ideal norm is multiplicative: for any ideals a, b, N (a · b) = N (a) · N (b).
Moreover this norm is closely linked to the norm of integers in the sense that
for every a ∈ OK, N (〈a〉)) =
∣∣NK/Q(a)∣∣, where 〈a〉 denotes the principal ideal
generated by a: 〈a〉 = {a · x|x ∈ OK}.
The norm of an ideal a can be used to give an upper bound on the norm of
the smallest nonzero element it contains: there always exists a nonzero a ∈ a for
which:
0 <
∣∣NK/Q(a)∣∣ ≤ ( 2
π
)r2 √
|∆K| N (a),
where ∆K is the discriminant of K and r2 is the number of pairs of complex
embeddings, defined as previously.
A.3 Dirichlet Unit Theorem
Unit group of a number field. Let K be a number field. The unit group UK
of K is the group of all integers in OK whose inverse also lies in OK. The unit
group has a simple geometric characterization in term of norm:
Lemma 6. An element a ∈ OK is an unit if and only if NK/Q(a) = 1.
Log-Unit lattice. Let N = [K : Q] be the degree of the number field, written
as n = r1 + 2r2, where r1 and r2 are defined respectively as the number of real
embeddings and the number of pairs of complex embeddings. Define the map
Log by{
K −→ Rr1+r2
x 7−→
(
log |σ1(x)|, · · · , log |σr1(x)|, 2 log |σr1+1(x)|, · · · , 2 log |σr1+r2(x)|
)
The image of the kernel of Log by the canonical embedding σ lies in the intersection
between the embedding σ(OK) and the set of points of coordinates lower than 1.
Since the embedding of OK is discrete, we deduce that σ(Ker Log) and so Ker Log
are discrete.
Moreover, the image Log(UK) lies in the hyperplane of equation
∑
xi = 0. A
careful analysis of this image shows that it is in fact a full-rank lattice of this
hyperplane. It is called the log-unit lattice associated to K. These remarks on
the map Log lead then to the complete description of the structure of UK.
Theorem 6 (Dirichlet’s Unit Theorem). Let K be a number field of degree
N = r1 + 2r2 with r1 and r2 the number of real and pairs of complex embeddings.
Then, the unit group of K is a direct product of a discrete cyclic group with a free
abelian group of rank r = r1 + r2 − 1.
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